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COMMUNITY AND COMMUNICATION
From the communication of separated consciousnesses
to the plurality of communicating persons
Ion Copoeru
In his Cartesian Meditations Husserl states that the radical reduction
entails the suppression of the communicative Us1. Stressing the role of
direct empathic connections, Husserl seems to limit drastically the role
of communication in the constitution of community and sociality, and
through this he seems to neglect or even contradict the contemporary
forms and tendencies of the human community, for which mediate,
symbolic levels are essential. Does community, in its strong pheno-
menological sense, actually exclude symbolic communication? If yes,
it would be difficult to explain how it reappears at the superior levels of
community and sociality. If we admit that a sort of communication is
inherent to the basic level of the constitution of community, we have
then to rethink the concepts of empathy and positionality, to define the
latter simply as analogical or imaginative and to renounce any trans-
cendental dimension of the theory of intersubjectivity, i. e. any non-
factual warranty of the giveness of the other. Thus, the question concer-
ning the role of communication in Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity
discloses a whole range of problems and paradoxes. It is clear then that
the solution cannot simply consist in negotiating a smaller or greater
percentage of the domain of communication. The analyses have to be
aimed at the very source of the problems; the phenomenon of community
has to be considered in itself, as a specific kind of objectivity.
The Husserlian concept of intersubjectivity has been criticized for the
fact that it belongs exclusively to a philosophy of representation and to a
solipsistic consciousness. In this conceptual framework, the other (ego)
appears to be constituted by a singular ego through the synthesis of the
series of its appearances (perceptive or imaginative representations) and
by extrapolation (transposition) of its own “sphere of originality”. For this
theory of constitution seemed to be essentially related to the concept of
objective representation that post-Husserlian phenomenologists have
criticized and eventually replaced with another, in which affectivity is
supposed to open the way to otherness, as we can see in Heidegger, Le-
vinas, Merleau-Ponty, Michel Henry or Jacques Derrida2.
Our hypothesis is that the difficulty does not regard the theory of
constitution, but the fact that the other and the community that he forms
with me and with many others are thought only in terms of representa-






































of Husserl’s function and replaced it with “affectivity” were not finally able to
overpass the representational framework, because the other has always been
for me (and vice-versa, I have been for him) only a “picture” (no matter
whether representative or “affective”), something which simply “stands”
before my eyes. But this is certainly a reductive way of understanding the
relation between the I and the other. If we focus our attention on the pheno-
menon of community and not on some interpretations or simplifications of it,
we realize that it is not sufficient that objective representation or affectivity or
any other faculty constitute or disclose the other for the I (even if that is a
necessary starting point). As a multilayered concept, “intersubjectivity”, in
Husserl’s sense, is a system of transitions from mere appearance to transcen-
dence, from passivity to activity, from cognitive and affective representation
to volition and action. As soon as we see the relation between the I and the
other as active, as an influence or intrusion of one consciousness in another, as
an intention to “move” the other, to determine him to assume or to begin an
action (a real one, effected in real life), the concept of intersubjectivity changes
drastically, even though the “representation” of the other before the I and of the
I in the eyes of the other remains a necessary interface.  Accordingly, consti-
tutive phenomenology has to take into consideration volition, action and
communication not simply as extensions of the constitution of the thing.
A reform of the theory of constitution, or rather its enlargement, to encompass
this new type of “objectivity” (praxis) which would thus offer an adequate
conceptual framework is strongly recommended.
If we take into account the way in which Husserl connects community and
communication, we could speak about two distinct periods in his doctrine of
intersubjectivity: one in which he tries to treat the other on the basis of the
theory of the constitution of the transcendent spatial object, elaborated in the
framework of a theory of knowledge which holds the truth as the ultimate
guide (thus, on a cognitive-representational basis) and another, in which the
dimension of interaction between egos is privileged. From this point of view,
the idea of communication contributes essentially to establishing the phe-
nomenological concept of community.
Absolute consciousnesses in communication
In Huserl’s work the topic of intersubjectivity emerges in an early stage in
the context of the problem of the reduction to “pure subjectivity”3. As early as
the lectures he gave during the winter semester 1910/11 Husserl envisaged an
“extension of the phenomenological reduction to intersubjectivity”4 through
the introduction of intersubjectivity in the thematic field of pure phenome-
nology5. In order to elucidate the possibility of reaching true exteriority and
objectivity, phenomenology had to deal with the task of passing over the
domain of absolute (Cartesian) giveness6, and this is achieved through trans-
gressing the prejudice of giveness’ actuality. By accepting other kinds of
phenomenological giveness, namely presentifications, and by tracing the lines
of the continuity of the consciousness from what is not to what is actually
given, Husserl succeeded in extending (and implicitly in redefining) the field
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of phenomenological experience as a sphere of a multiplicity of fluxes of
consciousness closed in themselves and attached to my own flux of conscious-
ness by the motivational relation of empathy (Einfühlung). Thus he managed
to integrate essentially heterogeneous fields of experience, i. e. intersubjecti-
vity, into a universal phenomenological science of experience, which becomes
a monadology requiring a transcendental theory of the communication of
separated consciousnesses.
Explicitly and, probably, for the first time the topic of communication in
relation to that of intersubjectivity appears in a text from 19097, where Husserl
deals with the “communication” between “absolute consciousnesses”, which
thus have to be considered as “not bordered”. His main concern here is the
theory of constitution: he tries to explain how a thing in itself can be brought
about only on the basis of its direct appearances or of what they entail. It seems
that objects that we cannot ever see, objects that cannot ever be given to our
senses raise a fundamental problem for this version of his theory. In order to
preserve the sense of objectivity as being given or possibly being given,
Husserl examines and apparently adopts the hypothesis of an absolute cons-
ciousness, which leads the phenomenological analysis to the further idea of
a plurality of absolute consciousnesses.
At this stage of Husserl’s thought, an absolute consciousness enters into
communication with another absolute consciousness, even in a conscious
communication8. He acknowledges the fact that “a certain communication is
always present”9. This apparently marginal observation is in fact an important
idea. A sort of communication exists at every level of the interrelations between
consciousnesses. But how is communication between different conscious-
nesses phenomenologically possible? An affirmative answer to this question
would presuppose a direct, immediate access to another consciousness, a direct
knowledge of the diversity of the egoic experiences of another person10. This
thesis is explicitly rejected, and the question concerning the (communicative)
relation between consciousnesses remains unsolved.
He acknowledges a “conflict”11 when he realizes that empathy cannot find
a confirmation in perception as the objective intention does12. The hypothesis
of a “total consciousness” (God) capable to see inside the consciousness of
others is not acceptable, because, on the one hand, it entails the unthinkable
idea that the being of God contains every other absolute being and, on the other
hand, the problem of empathy is circumvented but not truly solved. God does
not need empathy, but the supposed absolute consciousnesses inside the total
consciousness still empathize one with another and, moreover, they constitute
through an empathizing apperception an identical world for all individuals13.
Husserl realizes in a very early stage of his work that the theory of constitution
volition cannot succeed without a theory of intersubjectivity which explains
how it is possible14 for different finite consciousness to communicate with each
other and compare their respective objectivities.
In order to avoid the non-sense of direct communication between cons-
ciousnesses Husserl insists every time that communication expresses itself in
the way in which we speak in a founded manner about objective reality. If we
descend from the transcendental level of the communication between absolute
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consciousnesses to the level of the reciprocal exchange of meanings on the
basis of reciprocal empathy, communication entails a “knowledge”15  of one’s
body, of the bodies of others and of a common world. We should take notice
of the fact that the I – you relation is defined basically as “reciprocal know-
ledge”, or as a “spiritual relation founded in knowledge”16.
We can conclude for the moment that communication is in this period
reduced to knowledge, that it is nothing but a means for knowledge and its role
in the constitution of the community is seen as secondary. In the meanwhile,
Husserl kept in mind the problems raised by empathy, namely the “incompati-
bility of different individual consciousnesses”17, and, in Ideas I (1913), he
refined and generalized the theory of constitution so that it would grasp in a
unique conceptual scheme both objective representation and action. Thus, the
theory of constitution cannot be an impediment to the explicitation of the
authentic relation I – you, but, on the contrary, the platform on which the
phenomenological sense of community can be revealed.
Community, volition and action
Husserl expresses a radically different view18 in a text written in 193219,
a text considered “a beginning, but a fundamental one”20. In comparison with
his previous essays, this is certainly a new beginning, a new vision of other-
ness, almost a new theory of intersubjectivity – we might say –, because it is
situated in a totally different conceptual framework. The change of paradigm
was not obvious because Husserl kept his theory of constitution. What is
changed is the fact that representative subjectivity acquires the dimensions of
volition and action and becomes a new kind of “subject”: an acting subject.
This major change is made not by simply adding a new stratum of objectity
from the exterior. On the contrary, it starts from the most elementary levels of
experience. First of all, experience is not defined as a pure field of data – a certain
“interest”21 always inhabits it. Thus, the “ego of interest” is a key concept. What
is experienced is in fact what attracts me (certainly, the ego can also resist to the
appeal). A new key is used to distinguish between different phenomenological
forms of the same experience: “the function or the non-function related to an
activity”22. Accordingly, what is experienced can be thematized in different
modes: primary, secondary or can simply not be thematized.
Empathic experience has to be described in the same manner. The other is
an object of experience and this is why I am “absorbed in him”. I am living his
life appresentatively, I am experiencing him as a person in flash, and I am
doing that in my perceptual world, in the actual spatial field of my perceptual
now. The appresentation of the other presents me the other as himself having
a personal life. This can be passive (I see the other, but nothing attracts me to
it; it remains in the background of my perceptual life) or active. When it is
active, it means that I am consenting and submitting myself to the other person
(in the mode of quasi). Living with the other means that I submit myself by
appresentation to his experience, to his thinking, to his evaluation, to his
action23. I become his “accomplice”24. I take on his validities, his judgments as
if they were mine25.
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A common world is brought about through the coincidence of the egos and
of their fields of appearances.
But an action, a practical project cannot be taken on26. The volition of the
other, given in an appresentation, is not coincident with mine. When I get out
from the coincidence of the other ego, my volition remains unaltered and it is
the same for volition which ends in an action or is “deposited” in a work. We
have here an essential difference between doxa and praxis27. This does not
mean that the doxa does not have any role in the interplay of active subjects;
doxa has to be understood in the milieu of praxis, it serves action and is
reconfigured by it.
The theoretical implications of the distinction between doxa and praxis go
far beyond the clarification of the role of the representation in the phenomeno-
logical theory of intersubjectivity. The fact that Husserl has stressed the role of
a common “objective” world for the constitution of community and sociality
does not affect the specificity and the irreducibility of volition and, therefore,
of action28 and does not imply that different volitions can be as convictions or
opinions regarding an objective world.  The community remains essentially
plural, a place of the struggle of different or even opposite volitions.
Therefore the Husserlian concepts of volition and action deserve a closer
examination.
a) Volition
The subject takes knowledge of himself as the subject of a volition; when
he is alive, he has the certainty to be individuated by this volition29. The
volition which constitutes the self is a volition of an accord, of a harmony
between all the manifestations of the self, a struggle for maintaining identical
validity against the dispersion of the self and against a lack of coherence in its
acts. A theory of temporality is then required if we want to explain the temporal
continuity of volition; I suggest not taking this, which implies the affirmation
of past volitions and the affirmation of the self, into consideration.
The conservation of the self as a concordant unity of personal acts becomes
“true conservation” (wahre Selbsterhaltung) and it is the basis for Husserl’s
ethics. Ethics is brought into play when the individual strives to correspond to
the idea of the Self, considered as a telos which gives the norm for the personal
volition30.
The ethical idea of the Self considered in accord with others is in fact the
first step toward community. The concept of volition becomes thus fundamen-
tal not only for the constitution of the individual, but also for the constitution
of a community as a community of individuals. Seen in this way, human
community becomes essentially a practical community of volition. The consti-
tution of a community, described analytically as an “enlargement” of the sphere
of presence, is, from a structural point of view, a multilayered objectivity. The
basic stratum is that of the community between I (as primordial reflexive
monad), and the monad constituted in me as a foreign monad31. Engaged at
a transcendental level in an “intentional communion”, these monads are sepa-
rated in “reality” in psycho-physical beings which form an effective communi-
ty. A “world of humans” is constituted at the same time through an infinite
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community of monads32. If the archetypal relation I – you seemed to be, at the
transcendental level, an opposition, in the sense that the other is a “stranger”,
the community of humans is a reciprocal existence of one with another (and
its objectifying forms), guided by the striving to harmony. The simple addition
of one or several psycho-physical beings to another does not result in a com-
munity and even less in humanity33. Their coexistence is required in order to
make possible “social acts”, i. e. the acts of the self which appresentatively
penetrate into another Self and through which a communication between
human beings is established34. The action upon another, in the form of commu-
nication, founds the community as living together35. On the basis of this
primitive (elementary) social community and the objective world are consti-
tuted different kinds of social communities as sui generis spiritual objectivities
with their specific human milieu – “cultural worlds” 36.
The idea of a plurality of monads, together with that of the constitution of
personal unities of a higher degree37 , raises the question concerning the “fusi-
on”, i. e. the possibility of monads’ fusion with one another38. In opposition to
Dietrich Mahnke’s interpretation of Leibniz’s monadology, Husserl explicitly
rejects the idea of a fusion of monads39. Husserl’s monadology is based on the
results of an intentional analysis of the data of sensation. Being founded in the
unity of a homogenous sensory field, they are also homogenous and necessari-
ly dependent on a central ego. Therefore, they cannot belong to different egos.
Also, a consciousness without an ego is, according to this text, impossible40.
The idea of a rupture of the unitary sensibility in order to constitute two
separated unities is in turn excluded41. Much more plausible is, for Husserl, the
hypothesis of a “monadic plurality”, which has to be considered as “abso-
lute”42. A singular pure ego cannot accomplish the task of constituting objective
nature; on the contrary, a “pure and universally closed plurality of monadic
egos”43 is required.
Still, the intentional intrication does not exclude the real separation of
monads. After the phenomenological reduction I discover also the other trans-
cendental egos envisaged in my world of experience as humans44. In my
primordial being, the other is constituted as having another primordial being,
another personal being which effectuates activities, possesses faculties, expe-
riences and so forth45. In the constitution of a common world in the mediate
experience accomplished in me through the experience of the other and expe-
rience as such, a transcendental absolute consciousness manifests itself46. In
this, the absolutely being “world”, the universal absolute intersubjectivity is an
infinitely open multiplicity of separated transcendental subjects, and it exists
isolated from others as humans47.
This “transcendental separation” means that each individual (Individuel-
les), in its own temporality, cannot be identical with another, which also has to
be considered as a unique primordiality48. The phenomenological analyses
developed in pure immanence force us to acknowledge the absolute indivi-
duality or, which is the same, the absoluteness of individuality without rejec-
ting the moments of mediation or “communication” inside the original sphere
of presence49. Described in this manner – which, from a phenomenological
point of view, is certainly the most rigorous – the community, more precisely,
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the community of distinct personal selves, is also a place for communication
and the exercise of the volition. Already in the I – you relation, even if conside-
red as empathic, i. e. as a relation saturated first of all in a mere representation,
there is a moment when volition is present, namely as “permanent habitual
volition”, as volition of the continuation of the exchange between the two50.
Going deep in the constitutive structures of the community, Husserl re-
marks that the I and the you are necessarily in a “contact situation”, as, for
example, when one of them influences the physical or the spiritual world of the
other. The wish is prolonged into durable personal relationships (Husserl
analyses here especially the master – servant relationship and cooperation in
accomplishing a common goal)51.
At the same time, the members of the community should not be understood
exclusively as mere actors. A community has its own flesh; it is built upon
a bodily interactions. The intimate love, which becomes then a durable practi-
cal habitus, effectively puts two persons into direct relation. It entails an active
pleasure for the  beloved person, for his body and his spirit52, but only common
aspiration brings stability and durability to that community. Aspiration, in its
various forms, constitutes both the life of the self, which is nothing but a unity
of aspiration53, and that of the most elementary form of community, which thus
has to be as a community of aspiration54. With this, love becomes “ethical
love”55. Personal forms of community (community of pleasure, of care, of the
common lunch, in short: the family)56 constitute the basic level of community.
When we speak about this kind of community we should be careful not to
transform it into a mere ideal; it has to be dynamic one, one that changes. An
omission, momentary egoism, a lack of reason have always put in danger the
moral unity and the order of the community. In order to restore them, a “criti-
que” must intervene and must impose (personal or impersonal) duty and
responsibility57. In the constitutive order of the community should follow the
layer of “’artificially’ instituted communities”58 where duties are voluntarily
assumed or imposed by force. However, even in the community of volition
which concerns all the citizens of a state of law, a personal link, considered as
a chain of volitions or as a unanimity of volitions, is always present59.
My volition, at the same time, in a conscious way penetrates into the
volition of the other, and the other way round. This is particularly clear in the
case of the instauration of a master – servant relationship. There is not juxta-
position, but an intrication of sociality. “In a given sociality, a subjectivity goes
forth beyond itself in the interior of another subjectivity”60.
b) Action
Phenomenologically, we cannot understand the action of a constituted
subject directed toward the transformation of a real object without the elucida-
tion of what it is the meaning of an action inside the primordial ego. “The
action finds its foundation in the acting which I experienced ultimately in my
flesh, where my action is immediate and because it is immediate”61. The
problematic of constitution thus has to be pursued at the most elementary level,
which is that of primordial immediacy. Firstly, we can find acting in the flesh
and this is perceived in the most immediate manner; then, acting mediated by
the action, by the movement of the ego, a movement which can be perceived
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in a spatio-temporal manner; then, the apperception of the other as perceiving
subject, but also as acting subject, as subject which transforms himself and
which produces effects. After that, there are other series of mediations of the
experienced acting until we have action in the strict sense of the word: action
orientated toward the accomplishing of a goal62.
Husserl used to stress the absolute character of empathic knowledge63, and
by doing this empathy became a fundamental and self standing type of expe-
rience64. The model of the interaction between egos was considered to be that
of “imaginative transposition”, and this was supposed to overcome the abyss
between egoic selves65.  This perspective leaves very little place for communi-
cation. In 1932 Husserl clearly stated that active reciprocal empathy does not
produce any social unification. It is not a real connection between Me and You
which comes about with the presupposition of the Me-You unity of the Us
(emerged via habits). These unities are not simply a being together in the
world, they are not simply collections of humans, but personal communities,
personal reunifications of various types66. What is missing in a collection of
humans who have an active reciprocal empathic knowledge of each other?
Certainly the intention and the volition to express something; it lacks a specific
act of reciprocal communication67. Thus, communication creates community.
This is why a phenomenology of communication becomes both possible and
necessary.
Phenomenology of communication68
A phenomenology of communication has to explain the genesis of the
original act of reciprocal communication.  Prior to doing this, Husserl describes
its intentional structure. This structure is based on reciprocal empathy, more
precisely, on actual perceptive reciprocal empathy. Empathy allows me to
inscribe myself into the subjective being of the other. The alter ego becomes
a You. Being apprehended as another me, the other is seen as a subject, that is,
as a depositary of its own acts and powers. He can see, move, push, etc., this
object or any other. For me, His acts have the “equivocal character of expres-
sion”69; they are an external expression of an interiority, an announcement
which has an impact on me, even if the other doesn’t have this intention70. But
communication is not a simple effect that determines the other to do something.
If it were so, communication would be nothing other than manipulation.
Communication means that I have the intention to communicate and that I am
perceived and understood as such by the other. The other, with whom I am
related through empathy, understands that I express my interiority. Empathy
which is not developed as intention to communicate is not yet communication.
Husserl distinguishes between the effects of communication (the other
does this or that, takes in my knowledge, my desire, my volition, etc.) and the
mediated acts which make it possible. The specificity of the act of communi-
cation resides in the fact that I connect my desire to a verbal expression. The
other understands my verbal expression71 as such and he understands also that
I am addressing him. He becomes my interlocutor and I also become his.
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Sociality is founded in this stratified activity: through an active perception,
which becomes empathy, I direct myself to the other with the intention to
motivate (determine) his acts, I address him in order to share with him my
knowledge or my practical project, I make him understand what I am telling
him when I am addressing him. The actual connection of this interlocutive
community underlies any sociality72. “The linguistic bond is the fundamental
form of communicative unification, the original form of a particular coinci-
dence between me and the other; thus between any individual and any other
individual there is unification through what is said”73. My volition to communi-
cate, my act bearing a sense, “enters” into the other (given to me in appresenta-
tion), who appropriates that sense and answers me74.
What really absolves us from solitude and isolation is the bond between
active embodied consciousnesses.
Conclusions
As we have seen, volition and action are now fundamental for the under-
standing of the constitution of the other and of the communities I make with
him, and also for the communicative community. In order to understand the
constitution of community as a community of volition and action, the theory
of constitution had to be adapted. The need to take other’s experiences into
account and provide a coherent phenomenological analysis of this specific type
of experience put a great pressure on the Cartesian presuppositions of Husserl’s
theory of consciousness’ giveness. Accordingly, the theory of constitution had
to integrate praxis as a necessary condition for the access to others’ conscious-
nesses. Therefore, Husserl found a place for conceptual changes that opened
a discussion about the possibility of taking in or not the ideas or actions of the
other, a phenomenon which is explained much better as a modification of the
primordial sphere. Others do not appear simply as others which contributine
to the constitution of a thing in a doxic manner. If it were so, they would be
only presupposed and they should be identical to me. But, modifying the thing
together, we modify ourselves; we modify our primordial ego. Because of the
fact that the transformation is common, in every ego it emerges as a unity of
common transformation. For everyone who communicates, there are trans-
formations of existence. Communication is thus essentially connected with
transformation. Considered in its genuine sense, it occurs in situations where
there are actions directed towards the transformation of a thing, which entails
a further common transformation of the egos.
Trough the introduction of communication and transformation into the
discussion about community, phenomenology takes  a resolute distance from
any of the naturalistic views of the self and of the others. The alternative
individualism (atomism) – holism  is, evidently, a false one; community and
sociality can be thought only on an interactive basis. Volition, action, commu-
nication and common transformation becomes thus the four bases of a pheno-
menological concept of community. Community does not consist either in
related individuals or supra-individual objectivities; it is not an object, but
a dynamic form of life guided from inside by a teleological Idea.
Husserl succeeds in overcoming the modern distinction between repre-
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sentation and volition and he also succeeds in changing the purely ontological
(atomistic or holistic) vision of community into a community considered as
a “plurality of communicating persons”75. The continuity between I, other and
others, between the sphere of proximity and that of distance or mediation is
thought systematically and with the preservation of the specificity of each
constitutive level. He provides thus not only a comprehensive and complete
philosophical concept of community, but also a basis for the study of concrete
human interactions. The elucidation of otherness does not only solve a theore-
tical (ontological or ethical) problem, but it prepares the ground for an adequate
understanding of the role played, in its various forms, by political action in
contemporary societies and therefore for its transformation in accordance with
the exigencies of the present situation of humanity.
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